Mad Christian Democrats, the AfD’s internal conflicts, useless US polls, and the Wellcome Monitor: four links I liked

Mad Christian Democrats, the AfD's internal conflicts, useless US polls, and the Wellcome Monitor: four links I liked 1

On a very slow news day, two third-tier politicians for the centre-right CDU phantasise over future coalitions with the “moderates/liberals” within the AfD (where would they find them?). Ah yes, they also want to re-unite “the National” and “the Social”, which, by the lego-like greatness of the German language, becomes the “National-Social”. James F. Downes…

Regional support for the “Alternative for Germany” varies wildly

Regional support for the

The AfD was founded near Germany’s financial centre of gravity (Frankfort) by members of the old western elites. But early on, the eastern states of Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia became important for the further development of the party. It was here, during the 2014 state election season, that the AfD began to toy (very reluctantly…

Illegal AfD donations, Hobbes, #rstats, and social-media wars: 5 links I liked

Illegal AfD donations, Hobbes, #rstats, and social-media wars: 5 links I liked 3

More on the AfD’s donation scandal(s): media report that the ultimate source of the illicit donations to Alice Weidel is a German billionaire dynasty. The family also donated to the Swiss SVP. You will not be surprised to hear that they have pan-European global interests, moved to Switzerland, became dual nationals, and divide their time…

Die AfD in Ostdeutschland – die neue Regionalpartei?

Lokale Hochburgen (Wahlbezirke) von AfD und Linkspartei, 2017

Die AfD: in Ostdeutschland erfolgreich Seit 2014 ist die “Alternative für Deutschland” bei Landtagswahlen in Ostdeutschland sehr viel erfolgreicher als im Westen. Auch bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 wurde die AfD in weiten Teilen Ostdeutschlands zur stärksten Kraft. Nicht zuletzt aufgrund dieses sehr guten Abschneidens im Osten ist die AfD im Bundestag stärker vertreten als die…

AfD scandals, leftist coalition dreams, and Germany’s thoughts on Brexit: three links I liked

AfD scandals, leftist coalition dreams, and Germany's thoughts on Brexit: three links I liked 4

The co-leader of the right-wing populist “Alternative for Germany” finally admits that the received assistance from a Swiss media agency (in German). The price tag? About €90,000. Find the juicy details here (in German) or read my short summary of the many AfD scandals. Sarah Wagenknecht was one of the main obstacles to a closer…

Germany’s carnival and the Alternative for Germany

Germany's carnival and the Alternative for Germany 5

Germany’s carnival is supposed to be funny and political. Usually it is neither. But sometimes, there is a glimpse. Mocked at Mainz This is a picture I took at the Rosenmontagszug in Mainz, a major parade that attracts hundreds of thousands of revellers. The front of the float shows a pretty realistic AfD election poster…

Gespräch mit dem Handelsblatt über den Zustand der AfD und einen möglichen Rückzug Gaulands

Mit dem Handelsblatt habe ich über einen möglichen Rückzug Alexander Gaulands von seinen Ämtern gesprochen. Es ist fraglich, ob es in der AfD noch einen in irgendeiner Form organisierten gemäßigten Flügel gibt. [contentcards url="https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bei-gauland-rueckzug-parteienforscher-sehen-die-afd-vor-neuen-machtkaempfen/24038882.html" target="_blank"] Mit Gauland verlöre die AfD eine der letzten Persönlichkeiten, die nicht auf Grundlage ihrer Positionen, aber doch wenigstens auf Grund…

Video: the radical right & 4 critical elections in Western Europe in 2017

AfD results in 2017 federal election in Germany (map of districts)

As (West) European election years go, 2017 was quite something. The French party system changed beyond recognition. The radical right entered Germany’s national parliament for the first time. UKIP was wiped out, but May still managed to lose a comfortable majority. And very high fragmentation resulted in a coalition that looks improbable even by Dutch standards.

SCoRE is our multinational project that explores the link between local and regional living conditions on the one hand and radical right attitudes and behaviours in these four countries on the other. Sometimes, serendipity is really a thing. Because we had our individual-level data collection scheduled for this year anyway, we gained some unique insights into all four big Western European elections of 2017.

Update
The German chunk of this research now forms the base of an open access journal article. Click on the DOI to read it!

  • Arzheimer, Kai and Theresa Bernemann. “‘Place’ Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How? Evidence from Germany.” European Political Science Review 16.2 (2024): 167-186. doi:10.1017/S1755773923000279
    [BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]

    The notion of ‘place’ has become a central concern in research on the populist radical right (PRR), but scholars seem to have different things in mind when talking about how geography affects individual political attitudes. In our paper, we therefore aim to structure the debate on the impact of place and to understand exactly how place affects PRR attitudes (nativism, right-wing authoritarianism, and populism). Conceptually, we identify four potentially relevant aspects of ‘place’ that underpin much of the current literature: place-related attitudes (localism and resentment), place-specific living conditions, socio-demographic composition, and characteristics unique to a particular place, i.e., its local history and culture. We also discuss how these aspects are related and how they may interact. Empirically, we assess the relative importance of these four aspects of place for PRR sentiment in Germany, a country that is particularly well suited to this type of analysis. Using fine-grained geocoded survey data collected prior to the 2017 election, we find that (1) there is considerable spatial variation and clustering in PRR attitudes, (2) a place’s socio-demographic composition and (3) place resentment account for much of this, while (4) localism has weaker effects. We find (5) no relevant interaction between localism and place resentment, (6) no substantial evidence that mediation through place-related attitudes leads to an underestimation of the other aspects, and (7) no evidence for effects of the unique culture or history of the places we studied. Moreover, (8) location in the former GDR still has a substantial impact, whereas (9) other place-specific conditions (deprivation, demographic decline, migration, rurality) that could be addressed by policy interventions have no or rather weak effects. We conclude that PRR sentiment in ‘places that don’t matter’ results also, though by no means exclusively, from a lack of recognition.

    @Article{arzheimer-bernemann-2023,
    author = {Arzheimer, Kai and Bernemann, Theresa},
    title = {'Place' Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How?
    Evidence from Germany},
    journal = {European Political Science Review},
    year = 2024,
    volume = {16},
    number = {2},
    pages = {167-186},
    abstract = {The notion of 'place' has become a central concern in research on
    the populist radical right (PRR), but scholars seem to have
    different things in mind when talking about how geography affects
    individual political attitudes. In our paper, we therefore aim to
    structure the debate on the impact of place and to understand
    exactly how place affects PRR attitudes (nativism, right-wing
    authoritarianism, and populism). Conceptually, we identify four
    potentially relevant aspects of 'place' that underpin much of the
    current literature: place-related attitudes (localism and
    resentment), place-specific living conditions, socio-demographic
    composition, and characteristics unique to a particular place,
    i.e., its local history and culture. We also discuss how these
    aspects are related and how they may interact. Empirically, we
    assess the relative importance of these four aspects of place for
    PRR sentiment in Germany, a country that is particularly well
    suited to this type of analysis. Using fine-grained geocoded survey
    data collected prior to the 2017 election, we find that (1) there
    is considerable spatial variation and clustering in PRR attitudes,
    (2) a place's socio-demographic composition and (3) place
    resentment account for much of this, while (4) localism has weaker
    effects. We find (5) no relevant interaction between localism and
    place resentment, (6) no substantial evidence that mediation
    through place-related attitudes leads to an underestimation of the
    other aspects, and (7) no evidence for effects of the unique
    culture or history of the places we studied. Moreover, (8) location
    in the former GDR still has a substantial impact, whereas (9) other
    place-specific conditions (deprivation, demographic decline,
    migration, rurality) that could be addressed by policy
    interventions have no or rather weak effects. We conclude that PRR
    sentiment in 'places that don't matter' results also, though by no
    means exclusively, from a lack of recognition.},
    html = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/place-does-matter-for-populist-radical-right-sentiment-but-how-evidence-from-germany/7C639AAC5F6B1BC2F6324F7D57136827},
    pdf = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/7C639AAC5F6B1BC2F6324F7D57136827/S1755773923000279a.pdf/place-does-matter-for-populist-radical-right-sentiment-but-how-evidence-from-germany.pdf},
    doi = {10.1017/S1755773923000279}
    }

Accordingly, my colleagues have written up reports for France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, complete with beautiful maps. Who does not like maps?

But perhaps you’re pressed for time or not sure if you really want to read four (fairly short) reports? With the European Parliamentary elections on the horizon, I made a short explainer/teaser video about them to bring you up to speed in just over two minutes. I have a hunch that afterwards, you will want to read all four pieces.

AfD leader Gauland lectures at far-right academy (video)

Last weekend, AfD leader Alexander Gauland gave a lecture at a “winter school” organised by the Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS). The IfS is a far-right think whose state aim it is to form the future elite of far-right leaders. If you think that leader of Germany’s biggest opposition party being part of such a thing…

Schnellroda: AfD leader Gauland speaks at the New Right “winter school”

Schnellroda: AfD leader Gauland speaks at the New Right

What is the “winter school” for Germany’s New Right? This weekend, Alexander Gauland, co-leader of the AfD, will give a lecture at the annual “winter school”, a weekend seminar that is organised by the “Institut für Staatspolitik” (IfS). The IfS is a Wannabe-Nouvelle-Droite think tank based in Schnellroda, a tiny village in Saxony-Anhalt. Its mastermind…