Kai Arzheimer

About

I am professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz.

My main research interests are all in the field of political behaviour, broadly defined, and the methods required for its study. Much of my work is focused on the Far/Extreme/Radical Right vote in Europe. More recently, I found religion (not really).

Contact

• Email arzheimer@politik.uni-mainz.de
• Twitter: @kai_arzheimer (for more social channels, click the icons on the top)
• Sprechstunde/Office hours

Recent & Forthcoming Publications

• Arzheimer, Kai. “Im Osten nichts Neues? Die elektorale Unterstützung von AfD und Linkspartei in den alten und neuen Bundesländern bei der Bundestagswahl 2021.” Wahlen und Wähler – Analysen zur Bundestagwahl 2021. Eds. Schoen, Harald and Bernhard Weßels. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2024. 139-178. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-42694-1_6
  [BibTeX] [Download PDF] [HTML]

  @InCollection{arzheimer-2023c,
  author = {Arzheimer, Kai},
  title = {Im Osten nichts Neues? Die elektorale Unterstützung von AfD und
  Linkspartei in den alten und neuen Bundesländern bei der
  Bundestagswahl 2021},
  booktitle = {Wahlen und Wähler - Analysen zur Bundestagwahl 2021},
  publisher = {Springer},
  year = 2024,
  editor = {Schoen, Harald and Weßels, Bernhard},
  address = {Wiesbaden},
  url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/bundestagswahl-2021-ostdeutschland-linkspartei-afd.pdf},
  html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/bundestagswahl-2021-ostdeutschland-linkspartei-afd/},
  dateadded = {14-11-2022},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-42694-1_6},
  pages = {139-178}
  }

• Arzheimer, Kai. “The Links between Basic Human Values and Political Secularism. Evidence from Germany.” European Journal of Political Research 63.1 (2024): 370-382. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12585
  [BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML] [DATA]

  Scholarly interest in political secularism is currently growing. Political secularism is not the absence of religious belief, membership, or practice, but the conviction that politics and religion should be kept separate, and that religious arguments should have no standing in political debates. Little is known about the roots of this attitude, particularly outside the US. This is unfortunate, because politically secular attitudes strongly affect citizens’ views on so-called morality policies (e.g. the regulation of abortion, assisted suicide, or experiments with stem-cells) which are often highly controversial. In this research note, I focus on the link between political secularism and basic human values. From Schwartz’s own work and from the extant literatures on religion, secularism, and basic human values, I derive two hypotheses: self-direction should be linked to higher levels and tradition should be linked to lower levels of political secularism. Multivariate analysis of current survey data from Germany, a prototypical “religious-world country”, supports both hypotheses. Crucially, the relationships hold when controlling for three main facets of religion, for region (east vs west), and for socio-demographics. The results show that, net of their well-documented association with religion, basic human values contribute to our understanding of political secularism. More generally, the findings demonstrate once more the impact of basic human values on all areas of political life.

  @Article{arzheimer-2023d,
  author = {Arzheimer, Kai},
  title = {The Links between Basic Human Values and Political Secularism.
  Evidence from Germany},
  journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
  pages = {370-382},
  year = 2024,
  volume = {63},
  number = {1},
  abstract = {Scholarly interest in political secularism is currently growing.
  Political secularism is not the absence of religious belief,
  membership, or practice, but the conviction that politics and
  religion should be kept separate, and that religious arguments
  should have no standing in political debates. Little is known about
  the roots of this attitude, particularly outside the US. This is
  unfortunate, because politically secular attitudes strongly affect
  citizens' views on so-called morality policies (e.g. the regulation
  of abortion, assisted suicide, or experiments with stem-cells)
  which are often highly controversial. In this research note, I
  focus on the link between political secularism and basic human
  values. From Schwartz's own work and from the extant literatures on
  religion, secularism, and basic human values, I derive two
  hypotheses: self-direction should be linked to higher levels and
  tradition should be linked to lower levels of political secularism.
  Multivariate analysis of current survey data from Germany, a
  prototypical "religious-world country", supports both hypotheses.
  Crucially, the relationships hold when controlling for three main
  facets of religion, for region (east vs west), and for
  socio-demographics. The results show that, net of their
  well-documented association with religion, basic human values
  contribute to our understanding of political secularism. More
  generally, the findings demonstrate once more the impact of basic
  human values on all areas of political life.},
  data = {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/Z8VYBK},
  html = {https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1475-6765.12585?af=R},
  pdf = {https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-6765.12585},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12585},
  dateadded = {01-03-2023}
  }

• Arzheimer, Kai and Theresa Bernemann. “‘Place’ Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How? Evidence from Germany.” European Political Science Review 16.2 (2024): 167-186. doi:10.1017/S1755773923000279
  [BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]

  The notion of ‘place’ has become a central concern in research on the populist radical right (PRR), but scholars seem to have different things in mind when talking about how geography affects individual political attitudes. In our paper, we therefore aim to structure the debate on the impact of place and to understand exactly how place affects PRR attitudes (nativism, right-wing authoritarianism, and populism). Conceptually, we identify four potentially relevant aspects of ‘place’ that underpin much of the current literature: place-related attitudes (localism and resentment), place-specific living conditions, socio-demographic composition, and characteristics unique to a particular place, i.e., its local history and culture. We also discuss how these aspects are related and how they may interact. Empirically, we assess the relative importance of these four aspects of place for PRR sentiment in Germany, a country that is particularly well suited to this type of analysis. Using fine-grained geocoded survey data collected prior to the 2017 election, we find that (1) there is considerable spatial variation and clustering in PRR attitudes, (2) a place’s socio-demographic composition and (3) place resentment account for much of this, while (4) localism has weaker effects. We find (5) no relevant interaction between localism and place resentment, (6) no substantial evidence that mediation through place-related attitudes leads to an underestimation of the other aspects, and (7) no evidence for effects of the unique culture or history of the places we studied. Moreover, (8) location in the former GDR still has a substantial impact, whereas (9) other place-specific conditions (deprivation, demographic decline, migration, rurality) that could be addressed by policy interventions have no or rather weak effects. We conclude that PRR sentiment in ‘places that don’t matter’ results also, though by no means exclusively, from a lack of recognition.

  @Article{arzheimer-bernemann-2023,
  author = {Arzheimer, Kai and Bernemann, Theresa},
  title = {'Place' Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How?
  Evidence from Germany},
  journal = {European Political Science Review},
  year = 2024,
  volume = {16},
  number = {2},
  pages = {167-186},
  abstract = {The notion of 'place' has become a central concern in research on
  the populist radical right (PRR), but scholars seem to have
  different things in mind when talking about how geography affects
  individual political attitudes. In our paper, we therefore aim to
  structure the debate on the impact of place and to understand
  exactly how place affects PRR attitudes (nativism, right-wing
  authoritarianism, and populism). Conceptually, we identify four
  potentially relevant aspects of 'place' that underpin much of the
  current literature: place-related attitudes (localism and
  resentment), place-specific living conditions, socio-demographic
  composition, and characteristics unique to a particular place,
  i.e., its local history and culture. We also discuss how these
  aspects are related and how they may interact. Empirically, we
  assess the relative importance of these four aspects of place for
  PRR sentiment in Germany, a country that is particularly well
  suited to this type of analysis. Using fine-grained geocoded survey
  data collected prior to the 2017 election, we find that (1) there
  is considerable spatial variation and clustering in PRR attitudes,
  (2) a place's socio-demographic composition and (3) place
  resentment account for much of this, while (4) localism has weaker
  effects. We find (5) no relevant interaction between localism and
  place resentment, (6) no substantial evidence that mediation
  through place-related attitudes leads to an underestimation of the
  other aspects, and (7) no evidence for effects of the unique
  culture or history of the places we studied. Moreover, (8) location
  in the former GDR still has a substantial impact, whereas (9) other
  place-specific conditions (deprivation, demographic decline,
  migration, rurality) that could be addressed by policy
  interventions have no or rather weak effects. We conclude that PRR
  sentiment in 'places that don't matter' results also, though by no
  means exclusively, from a lack of recognition.},
  html = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/place-does-matter-for-populist-radical-right-sentiment-but-how-evidence-from-germany/7C639AAC5F6B1BC2F6324F7D57136827},
  pdf = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/7C639AAC5F6B1BC2F6324F7D57136827/S1755773923000279a.pdf/place-does-matter-for-populist-radical-right-sentiment-but-how-evidence-from-germany.pdf},
  doi = {10.1017/S1755773923000279}
  }

• Arzheimer, Kai. “Elektorat(e) rechter Flügelparteien.” Handbuch Rechtsextremismus. Eds. Häusler, Alexander, Cordelia Heß, Anke Hoffstad, and Florian Virchow. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2023. . doi:10.1007/978-3-658-38373-2_24-1
  [BibTeX] [Download PDF] [HTML]

  @InCollection{arzheimer-2023a,
  author = {Arzheimer, Kai},
  title = {Elektorat(e) rechter Flügelparteien},
  booktitle = {Handbuch Rechtsextremismus},
  publisher = {Springer VS},
  year = 2023,
  editor = {Häusler, Alexander and Heß, Cordelia and Hoffstad, Anke and
  Virchow, Florian},
  html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/elektorat-rechte-parteien},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-38373-2_24-1},
  url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/waehler-rechter-parteien.pdf},
  address = {Wiesbaden},
  }

• Arzheimer, Kai. “Quantitative Methoden zur Erforschung von rechtsextremistischem / rechtsradikalem / rechtspopulistischem Wahlverhalten.” Handbuch Rechtsextremismus. Eds. Häusler, Alexander, Cordelia Heß, Anke Hoffstad, and Florian Virchow. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2023. .
  [BibTeX] [Download PDF] [HTML]

  @InCollection{arzheimer-2023b,
  author = {Arzheimer, Kai},
  title = {Quantitative Methoden zur Erforschung von rechtsextremistischem /
  rechtsradikalem / rechtspopulistischem Wahlverhalten},
  booktitle = {Handbuch Rechtsextremismus},
  publisher = {Springer VS},
  year = 2023,
  editor = {Häusler, Alexander and Heß, Cordelia and Hoffstad, Anke and
  Virchow, Florian},
  address = {Wiesbaden},
  url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/quantitative-methoden-rechtsradikal-wahlverhalten.pdf},
  html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/quantitative-methoden-rechtsextremismus},
  }

• Arzheimer, Kai. “To Russia with love? German populist actors’ positions vis-a-vis the Kremlin.” The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Eds. Ivaldi, Gilles and Emilia Zankina. Brussels: European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023. 156-167. doi:10.55271/rp0020
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]

  Russia’s fresh attack on Ukraine and its many international and national repercussions have helped to revive the fortunes of Germany’s main radical right-wing populist party ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD). Worries about traditional industries, energy prices, Germany’s involvement in the war and hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving in Germany seem to have contributed to a modest rise in the polls after a long period of stagnation. However, the situation is more complicated for the AfD than it would appear at first glance. While many party leaders and the rank-and-file have long held sympathies for Putin and more generally for Russia, support for Ukraine is still strong amongst the German public, even if there is some disagreement about the right means and the acceptable costs. At least some AfD voters are appalled by the levels of Russian violence against civilians, and the party’s electorate is divided as to the right course of action. To complicate matters, like on many other issues, there is a gap in opinion between Germany’s formerly communist federal states in the East and the western half of the country. As a result, the AfD leadership needs to tread carefully or risk alienating party members and voters in the more populous western states. Beyond the AfD, the current and future consequences of the war have galvanised the larger far-right movement, particularly in the East. Moreover, they have led to further tensions in the left-wing populist “Linke” (left) party, which is traditionally pacifist and highly sceptical of NATO. The majority of the party tries to square commitment to these principles with solidarity with the victims of Russian aggression. A small but very visible faction, however, shows at least a degree of support for Russia and blames NATO and the US for the war.

  @InCollection{arzheimer-2023e,
  author = {Arzheimer, Kai},
  title = {To Russia with love? German populist actors' positions vis-a-vis
  the Kremlin},
  booktitle = {The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing
  Populism in Europe},
  publisher = {European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)},
  year = 2023,
  editor = {Ivaldi, Gilles and Zankina, Emilia},
  pages = {156-167},
  address = {Brussels},
  abstract = {Russia's fresh attack on Ukraine and its many international and
  national repercussions have helped to revive the fortunes of
  Germany's main radical right-wing populist party 'Alternative for
  Germany' (AfD). Worries about traditional industries, energy
  prices, Germany's involvement in the war and hundreds of thousands
  of refugees arriving in Germany seem to have contributed to a
  modest rise in the polls after a long period of stagnation.
  However, the situation is more complicated for the AfD than it
  would appear at first glance. While many party leaders and the
  rank-and-file have long held sympathies for Putin and more
  generally for Russia, support for Ukraine is still strong amongst
  the German public, even if there is some disagreement about the
  right means and the acceptable costs. At least some AfD voters are
  appalled by the levels of Russian violence against civilians, and
  the party's electorate is divided as to the right course of action.
  To complicate matters, like on many other issues, there is a gap in
  opinion between Germany's formerly communist federal states in the
  East and the western half of the country. As a result, the AfD
  leadership needs to tread carefully or risk alienating party
  members and voters in the more populous western states. Beyond the
  AfD, the current and future consequences of the war have galvanised
  the larger far-right movement, particularly in the East. Moreover,
  they have led to further tensions in the left-wing populist "Linke"
  (left) party, which is traditionally pacifist and highly sceptical
  of NATO. The majority of the party tries to square commitment to
  these principles with solidarity with the victims of Russian
  aggression. A small but very visible faction, however, shows at
  least a degree of support for Russia and blames NATO and the US for
  the war.},
  doi = {10.55271/rp0020}
  }

Click here for my full list of publications.

Consultancy

• Media: I regularly comment on German and European parties and their voters, and on political extremism. 
• Research Methods: I have been teaching methods, statistics and software in academic settings since 1996 and offer consultancy and in-house seminars. 

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