

SCoRE and the Geography of Radical Right-Wing Resentment in Germany

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Introduction

Definitions: (populist) radical right (Mudde, 2007, 2019)

radical nativist + authoritarian

extremist nativist + authoritarian + openly anti-democratic

populist homogeneous people vs corrupt elite

far right {radical, extremist} (with or without populism)

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In West European mass politics, right-wing radicalism is particularly important

Why (subnational) contexts?

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- Useful distinction between demand, supply, and truly contextual factors (Arzheimer, 2018; Golder, 2016)
- Conceptually, context can *cause* or *moderate* demand
 - Deprivation, decline, ethnic/cultural threat and competition, (positive contact)
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 - Institutions, welfare, opportunities ...

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 - Institutions, welfare, opportunities ...
- Multitude of comparative studies focusing on *national* context since early 2000s (e.g. Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002)
- Soon complemented by a push to include regional or even local contexts in case studies (e.g. Kestilä and Söderlund, 2007) – why?

Why subnational contexts?

- Huge variation of political, social, economic conditions & historic legacies *within* larger European states
- Regional/local conditions possibly more important than national ones
- Plus: linkage between localism/regionalism and radical right issues (e.g. Cramer, [2016](#); Fitzgerald, [2018](#))

A proposal:

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A proposal: a comparative study that simultaneously accounts for local, regional, national contexts

Sub-national context and radical right support in Europe (SCoRE)

What is/was the SCoRE project?

- Funded 2016-19 under the Open Research Area scheme (ANR, DFG, ESRC, NWO)
- Four teams in four countries:
 - Amsterdam: Wouter van der Brug, Eelco Hartevelde, Sarah de Lange, Tom van der Meer,
 - Leeds: Jocelyn Evans, Myles Gould, Nicholas Hood, Paul Norman
 - Mainz: Kai Arzheimer, Carl Berning
 - Nice: Jérôme Dutozia, Gilles Ivaldi
- Our aims:

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- Our aims:
 - Identify comparable local areas
 - Collect and harmonise official data on these
 - Conduct customised large scale survey across four countries
 - Link micro and macro data
 - <https://www.score.uni-mainz.de>

What did go well?

- Excellent international and interdisciplinary co-operation (political science, sociology, geography)
- Comparable micro data across four countries, tailored to radical right research

Which snags did we hit?



- (country selection driven by funding opportunity), N=4 at country level
- Very difficult to find comparable areas and to harmonise official data
- Problems with data access, comparability, and protection
 - Almost ideal situation in NL & UK
 - France objects to data collection on ethnicity/race
 - Germany is an unqualified nightmare

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- Geographers and one postdoc were not funded for the full period
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- The pandemic did not help

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- The pandemic did not help
- Comparative findings sometimes difficult to communicate

What are our main findings?


- Broadly similar relationships in all four countries
- Comparative paper has been under review for last five months
 - *Why do we often observe similar outcomes in different contexts and vice versa?*
 - Perceived and objective local decline leads to nativism/populism (which in turn are linked to radical right support)
 - These effects should be moderated by education and local embeddedness
 - Local embeddedness is less important than we thought
 - (Local) immigration does hardly matter for highly educated voters
 - Strength/significance of effects varies across countries

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 - Strength/significance of effects varies across countries
- Case studies on France, NL are out (Evans and Ivaldi, 2020; Harteveld et al., 2021)
- Case studies on UK and Germany (deep) in the pipeline <coughs>

The geography of right-wing resentment in Germany: context or composition?

Spatial disparities in radical right-wing voting




THE GEOGRAPHY OF RIGHT-WING RESENTMENT IN GERMANY: CONTEXT OR COMPOSITION? *Research question*

What is the meaning of this?

Spatial variation Electoral success varies (greatly) across areas

Spatial clustering Variation not random – whole regions of more/less success




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Taken together: spatial contexts do seem to matter


- Because of their measurable qualities?
- Because of their identities (idiosyncratic)?



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Taken together: spatial contexts do seem to matter

- Because of their measurable qualities?
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Research question: to what degree does this reflect ...

- True contextual effects (direct/indirect)?
- Mere (self-)sorting of voters?

Focus on attitudes: nativism, authoritarianism, populism

- Strip away spatial variation driven by (contextual) supply-side effects (electoral strength of Radical Right, other parties & organisations ...)
- Show *potential* for right-wing mobilisation
- Still as much variation/clustering?

What contexts?

What contexts?



What contexts?

- Counties (Kreise) - probably the best kind of area for Germany but ...
 - Self-governance, NUTS-3
 - In terms of population, some very small (kleine kreisfreie Städte), some very large (Berlin)
 - Between 5 and 1015 (!) respondents per county
 - Already too large for *local* effects?
- Localities (can talk more about this later)
 - Exact addresses known to pollster, but not to us
 - Can be converted to grid-cells, but *data protection*
 - Also: (reduced) information on Regionalschlüssel (GKZ) + (incomplete) information on structure of BIK region → 8737 “locations” within counties


Three-level models for attitudes

- \approx 25,000 respondents
- within small-ish localities
- within districts (Kreise)


Three-level models for attitudes

- \approx 25,000 respondents
- within small-ish localities
- within districts (Kreise)
- *How is random variance distributed across three levels (VPC)?*
- *After controlling for individual/contextual variables: is there still spatial clustering of shocks at regional (county) level?*

Nativism: cultural threat perceptions (Moran's $R = 0.188$)




\bar{x}	Kreis	Land	n
3.33	Landau in der Pfalz	Rheinland-Pfalz	13
3.79	Vechta	Niedersachsen	12
3.83	Vulkaneifel	Rheinland-Pfalz	6
3.86	Zweibrücken	Rheinland-Pfalz	7
3.86	Heidelberg	Baden-Württemberg	45
3.87	Trier	Rheinland-Pfalz	39
	⋮		
	⋮		
5.12	Mansfeld-Südharz	Sachsen-Anhalt	52
5.13	Osterholz	Niedersachsen	18
5.21	Regen	Bayern	20
5.30	Birkenfeld	Rheinland-Pfalz	9
5.47	Kaufbeuren	Bayern	5
5.71	Pirmasens	Rheinland-Pfalz	8




THE GEOGRAPHY OF RIGHT-WING RESENTMENT IN GERMANY: CONTEXT OR COMPOSITION? *Show us some maps!*

Nativism: islamophobia (Moran's $R = 0.143$)




\bar{x}	Kreis	Land	n
3.88	Miesbach	Bayern	17
4.00	Cloppenburg	Niedersachsen	7
4.04	Weiden i.d. OPf.	Bayern	16
4.05	Vechta	Niedersachsen	12
4.11	Freiburg im Breisgau	Baden-Württemberg	51
4.15	Ravensburg	Baden-Württemberg	41
:			
:			
5.81	Birkenfeld	Rheinland-Pfalz	9
5.84	Schwabach	Bayern	26
5.88	Jerichower Land	Sachsen-Anhalt	17
5.90	Kaufbeuren	Bayern	5
6.25	Lüchow-Dannenberg	Niedersachsen	11
6.29	Pirmasens	Rheinland-Pfalz	8




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Authoritarianism (Moran's $R = 0.161$)




\bar{x}	Kreis	Land	n
3.00	Vulkaneifel	Rheinland-Pfalz	6
3.13	Dillingen a.d. Donau	Bayern	8
3.14	Freiburg im Breisgau	Baden-Württemberg	51
3.16	Ulm	Baden-Württemberg	23
3.19	Ravensburg	Baden-Württemberg	41
3.21	Breisgau-Hochschwarzwald	Baden-Württemberg	63
	:		
	:		
4.69	Wittmund	Niedersachsen	8
4.69	Hohenlohekreis	Baden-Württemberg	19
4.71	Eichsfeld	Thüringen	17
4.71	Odenwaldkreis	Hessen	19
5.00	Jerichower Land	Sachsen-Anhalt	17
5.00	Pirmasens	Rheinland-Pfalz	8




THE GEOGRAPHY OF RIGHT-WING RESENTMENT IN GERMANY: CONTEXT OR COMPOSITION? *Show us some maps!*

Populism (Moran's $R = 0.163$)



\bar{x}	Kreis	Land	n
4.62	Emden	Niedersachsen	14
4.75	Ammerland	Niedersachsen	30
4.77	Amberg	Bayern	11
4.84	Steinburg	Schleswig-Holstein	30
4.85	Eifelkreis Bitburg-Prüm	Rheinland-Pfalz	21
4.86	Cloppenburg	Niedersachsen	7
.	.	.	.
5.82	Lüchow-Dannenberg	Niedersachsen	11
5.85	Dingolfing-Landau	Bayern	26
5.94	Kyffhäuserkreis	Thüringen	18
6.05	Baden-Baden	Baden-Württemberg	5
6.19	Zweibrücken	Rheinland-Pfalz	7
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 - Between 97 (economic threat perceptions) and 99 (populism) of variation at the *individual* level
 - Rest roughly equally split between location and county

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- Run empty (no x-var) 3-level-models for attitudes & partition variance
 - Between 97 (economic threat perceptions) and 99 (populism) of variation at the *individual* level
 - Rest roughly equally split between location and county
- Suggests that local context is not very important, and patterns could be mostly compositional

What can (statistically) explain the variation?

Well-known individual factors

- Gender, Age, Education
- (Occupational) class and (unemployment)

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Contextual (county-level) factors

Migration share of foreigners, (logged) share of refugees

Deprivation and demographic decline share of people on benefits, share of young women, remaining male life expectancy at 60

Structure/rurality “siedlungsstrukturelle Kreistypen” (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) cities ... very rural. Distinguish between old industrial vs modern service-based cities?

Peripherality (Would be nice to have a measure of being peripheral, but difficult in a polycentric country)


Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Cultural threat	Islamophobia	Authoritaria sub.	Populism
	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>
Male	-0.018	0.150***	0.107***	0.065***
Education: high	-0.476***	-0.506***	-0.588***	-0.332***
30-39	0.223***	0.371***	0.243***	0.117***
40-49	0.166***	0.539***	0.204***	0.222***
50-59	0.018	0.569***	0.166***	0.305***
60+	-0.137***	0.764***	0.386***	0.372***
Technical/manual occ.	0.204***	0.165***	0.206***	0.176***
Unemployed/sick	0.088*	0.094	-0.001	0.246***
Urban/suburban	0.077*	0.110**	0.129***	0.075**
Rural	0.064	0.057	0.100*	0.106**
Really rural	0.060	0.077	0.032	0.080*
pct on benefits	-0.008**	-0.011**	0.002	-0.003
pct foreigners	0.008**	0.004	0.002	0.009***
Ln pct refugees	-0.009	-0.003	0.015	-0.004
share female of 25-30	-0.006	0.003	-0.015*	-0.014**
Life exptancy: men>60	-0.100***	-0.075***	-0.080***	-0.048***
Old West	-0.122	-0.147*	-0.164*	-0.173***
Old East	0.115	0.166*	0.050	0.060
Constant	7.036***	6.162***	6.264***	6.814***
Variance: county	0.004***	0.000***	0.003***	0.000
Variance: locality	0.017***	0.009***	0.032***	0.001
Variance: person	1.556***	2.676***	2.204***	1.232***
Observations	25178	23957	24663	25043


What does this even mean?

- Right-wing resentment is substantially affected by socio-demographics (**education**, **being young**, technical/manual occupation (& unemployment))
- Essentially no effect of immigration
- Strong positive effects of deprivation (life expectancy)
- Properly urban districts less right-wing (should perhaps recode)
- Even after controlling for this, some remaining east-west differences (strongest for Islamophobia)
- Random effects of county (and locality) have very low variances, but is there regional clustering?

Estimated county effects (BLUPs): Nativism




Moran's $R = 0.118$ (global)




Moran's $R = 0.107$ (global)

THE GEOGRAPHY OF RIGHT-WING RESENTMENT IN GERMANY: CONTEXT OR COMPOSITION? *Mapping random county effects*

Estimated county effects (BLUPs): Authoritarianism and Populism



Moran's $R = 0.07$ (global)



Moran's $R = 0.014$ (global)

THE GEOGRAPHY OF RIGHT-WING RESENTMENT IN GERMANY: CONTEXT OR COMPOSITION? *Mapping random county effects*



Problems ... and a potential solution

- Effects are really small
- Apophenia: a tendency to spot meaningful patterns in a random world
- Maps show *estimates* of random effects → take uncertainty into account
- We are really interested in clustering – *whole regions* that stand out

Problems ... and a potential solution



- Effects are really small
- Apophenia: a tendency to spot meaningful patterns in a random world
- Maps show *estimates* of random effects → take uncertainty into account
- We are really interested in clustering – *whole regions* that stand out
- Look at *local* indicators of (positive) spatial association
- Filter out counties where high local association could be due to chance

Clustermap: nativism



THE GEOGRAPHY OF RIGHT-WING RESENTMENT IN GERMANY: CONTEXT OR COMPOSITION? *Mapping random county effects*

Clustermap: authoritarianism and populism



THE GEOGRAPHY OF RIGHT-WING RESENTMENT IN GERMANY: CONTEXT OR COMPOSITION? *Mapping random county effects*

Conclusion

- Largely compositional
- Some contextual effects of urbanisation, deprivation and decline
- Even after controlling for that, some east/west differences remain
- And after controlling for that
 - some significant clustering of nativist attitudes in “Mitteldeutschland” and Ruhr area (plus anti-nativist cluster between Cologne/Aachen)
 - authoritarian clusters in Ruhr, Franconia & anti-populist area between Hamburg and Hanover
- But overall, local/regional effects weak(er than expected)

What next?


- Look into measurement of peripherality
- Directly model spatial dependencies?
- Look at role of place resentment
- ...

References

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Attitudes: operationalisations


Cultural threat perceptions All should have same cultures and traditions, culture benefits from immigration (rev), immigration reduces crime (rev)

Islamophobia Islam is an archaic religion, Islam is susceptible to infiltration by terrorists

Authoritarianism country needs law and order, country needs disciplined citizenry that uniformly supports national leaders

Populism Politicians should follow will of the people, people, not politicians should rule, more conflict between elites and citizens than within citizenry, MPs talk too much

Subjective probability of AfD vote (Moran's $R = 0.199$)



\bar{x}	Kreis	Land	n
1.07	Altmarkkreis Salzwedel	Sachsen-Anhalt	15
1.08	Landau in der Pfalz	Rheinland-Pfalz	13
1.10	Saale-Orla-Kreis	Thüringen	10
1.14	Zweibrücken	Rheinland-Pfalz	7
1.36	Garmisch-Partenkirchen	Bayern	11
1.38	Dillingen a.d. Donau	Bayern	8
.			
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4.57	Wartburgkreis	Thüringen	37
4.74	Bautzen	Sachsen	72
4.89	Unstrut-Hainich-Kreis	Thüringen	28
5.22	Kyffhäuserkreis	Thüringen	18
6.60	Kaufbeuren	Bayern	5
7.50	Pirmasens	Rheinland-Pfalz	8

