About
I am professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz.
My main research interests are all in the field of political behaviour, broadly defined, and the methods required for its study. Much of my work is focused on the Far/Extreme/Radical Right vote in Europe. More recently, I found religion (not really).Contact
- Email arzheimer@politik.uni-mainz.de
- Twitter: @kai_arzheimer (for more social channels, click the icons on the top)
- Sprechstunde/Office hours
Recent & Forthcoming Publications
- Arzheimer, Kai. “Wahlforschung in der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft.” Handbuch Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Eds. Kneuer, Marianne, Gerd Pickel, and Susanne Pickel. 2 ed. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2025. .
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [HTML]In den 1970er-Jahren hat sich die bis dahin US-amerikanisch geprägte Wahlforschung internationalisiert. Seit den 1990er-Jahren ist der Mainstream der Wahlforschung vergleichend ausgerichtet, da sich die Wirkung institutioneller und anderer kontextueller Variablen nur so kontrollieren lässt. Neben dem internationalen Vergleich werden dabei zunehmend auch subnationale Kontexte berücksichtigt oder beide Perspektiven miteinander kombiniert. Eine leistungsfähige Forschungsinfrastruktur, der technische Fortschritt bei Hard- und Software sowie die enorm gestiegene Qualität der quantitativ-methodologischen Ausbildung haben diese Entwicklung ermöglicht und vorangetrieben.
@InCollection{arzheimer-2025, author = {Arzheimer, Kai}, title = {Wahlforschung in der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft}, booktitle = {Handbuch Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft}, publisher = {Springer VS}, year = 2025, editor = {Kneuer, Marianne and Pickel, Gerd and Pickel, Susanne}, edition = 2, address = {Wiesbaden}, html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/vergleichende-wahlforschung/}, url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/vergleichende-wahlforschung.pdf}, abstract = {In den 1970er-Jahren hat sich die bis dahin US-amerikanisch geprägte Wahlforschung internationalisiert. Seit den 1990er-Jahren ist der Mainstream der Wahlforschung vergleichend ausgerichtet, da sich die Wirkung institutioneller und anderer kontextueller Variablen nur so kontrollieren lässt. Neben dem internationalen Vergleich werden dabei zunehmend auch subnationale Kontexte berücksichtigt oder beide Perspektiven miteinander kombiniert. Eine leistungsfähige Forschungsinfrastruktur, der technische Fortschritt bei Hard- und Software sowie die enorm gestiegene Qualität der quantitativ-methodologischen Ausbildung haben diese Entwicklung ermöglicht und vorangetrieben.} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “Islamophobia in Western Europe is unrelated to religiosity but highly correlated with far right attitudes.” Research & Politics 12.3 (2025): online first. doi:10.1177/20531680251351895
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [HTML]The far right’s relationship with religion has become a major focus of current research. Even in Western Europe, one of the most rapidly secularising areas of the world, far right actors claim to defend Christian values against the alleged threat of Islam and Muslim immigrants, a rhetorical strategy known as ‘Christianism’. Yet, little is known about how religiosity, Islamophobia, and populist far-right ideology are connected at the level of mass belief systems in Western Europe. Most of the literature is focused either on religiosity’s effect on voting or on the connection between religiosity and ethnic prejudice, without considering religiosity’s relationships with the wider spectrum of far-right ideology. The present article fills this gap by analysing survey data from Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. It uses SEM to uncover the relationships between Christian religiosity on the one hand and Islamophobia and far-right attitudes on the other. The results are broadly similar across different contexts: religiosity is mostly unrelated to Islamophobia, nativism, right-wing authoritarianism, and populism. Conversely, Islamophobia overlaps considerably with both nativism and authoritarianism: people who perceive immigration as a threat and favour strict laws and harsh enforcement also tend to reject Islam, but not for religious reasons. This pattern is compatible with the strategy of Christianism, which is largely devoid of religiosity, yet facilitates the “othering” of Muslims as a cultural out-group. It also helps to explain why there is no genuine, electorally relevant religious far right in Western Europe.
@Article{arzheimer-2025b, author = {Kai Arzheimer}, title = {Islamophobia in Western Europe is unrelated to religiosity but highly correlated with far right attitudes}, journal = {Research \& Politics}, year = 2025, volume = 12, number = 3, pages = {online first}, html = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20531680251351895}, abstract = {The far right's relationship with religion has become a major focus of current research. Even in Western Europe, one of the most rapidly secularising areas of the world, far right actors claim to defend Christian values against the alleged threat of Islam and Muslim immigrants, a rhetorical strategy known as 'Christianism'. Yet, little is known about how religiosity, Islamophobia, and populist far-right ideology are connected at the level of mass belief systems in Western Europe. Most of the literature is focused either on religiosity's effect on voting or on the connection between religiosity and ethnic prejudice, without considering religiosity's relationships with the wider spectrum of far-right ideology. The present article fills this gap by analysing survey data from Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. It uses SEM to uncover the relationships between Christian religiosity on the one hand and Islamophobia and far-right attitudes on the other. The results are broadly similar across different contexts: religiosity is mostly unrelated to Islamophobia, nativism, right-wing authoritarianism, and populism. Conversely, Islamophobia overlaps considerably with both nativism and authoritarianism: people who perceive immigration as a threat and favour strict laws and harsh enforcement also tend to reject Islam, but not for religious reasons. This pattern is compatible with the strategy of Christianism, which is largely devoid of religiosity, yet facilitates the "othering" of Muslims as a cultural out-group. It also helps to explain why there is no genuine, electorally relevant religious far right in Western Europe.}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/reader/10.1177/20531680251351895}, doi = {10.1177/20531680251351895} } - Arzheimer, Kai and Theresa Bernemann. “‘Place’ Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How? Evidence from Germany.” European Political Science Review 16.2 (2024): 167-186. doi:10.1017/S1755773923000279
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]The notion of ‘place’ has become a central concern in research on the populist radical right (PRR), but scholars seem to have different things in mind when talking about how geography affects individual political attitudes. In our paper, we therefore aim to structure the debate on the impact of place and to understand exactly how place affects PRR attitudes (nativism, right-wing authoritarianism, and populism). Conceptually, we identify four potentially relevant aspects of ‘place’ that underpin much of the current literature: place-related attitudes (localism and resentment), place-specific living conditions, socio-demographic composition, and characteristics unique to a particular place, i.e., its local history and culture. We also discuss how these aspects are related and how they may interact. Empirically, we assess the relative importance of these four aspects of place for PRR sentiment in Germany, a country that is particularly well suited to this type of analysis. Using fine-grained geocoded survey data collected prior to the 2017 election, we find that (1) there is considerable spatial variation and clustering in PRR attitudes, (2) a place’s socio-demographic composition and (3) place resentment account for much of this, while (4) localism has weaker effects. We find (5) no relevant interaction between localism and place resentment, (6) no substantial evidence that mediation through place-related attitudes leads to an underestimation of the other aspects, and (7) no evidence for effects of the unique culture or history of the places we studied. Moreover, (8) location in the former GDR still has a substantial impact, whereas (9) other place-specific conditions (deprivation, demographic decline, migration, rurality) that could be addressed by policy interventions have no or rather weak effects. We conclude that PRR sentiment in ‘places that don’t matter’ results also, though by no means exclusively, from a lack of recognition.
@Article{arzheimer-bernemann-2023, author = {Arzheimer, Kai and Bernemann, Theresa}, title = {'Place' Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How? Evidence from Germany}, journal = {European Political Science Review}, year = 2024, volume = {16}, number = {2}, pages = {167-186}, abstract = {The notion of 'place' has become a central concern in research on the populist radical right (PRR), but scholars seem to have different things in mind when talking about how geography affects individual political attitudes. In our paper, we therefore aim to structure the debate on the impact of place and to understand exactly how place affects PRR attitudes (nativism, right-wing authoritarianism, and populism). Conceptually, we identify four potentially relevant aspects of 'place' that underpin much of the current literature: place-related attitudes (localism and resentment), place-specific living conditions, socio-demographic composition, and characteristics unique to a particular place, i.e., its local history and culture. We also discuss how these aspects are related and how they may interact. Empirically, we assess the relative importance of these four aspects of place for PRR sentiment in Germany, a country that is particularly well suited to this type of analysis. Using fine-grained geocoded survey data collected prior to the 2017 election, we find that (1) there is considerable spatial variation and clustering in PRR attitudes, (2) a place's socio-demographic composition and (3) place resentment account for much of this, while (4) localism has weaker effects. We find (5) no relevant interaction between localism and place resentment, (6) no substantial evidence that mediation through place-related attitudes leads to an underestimation of the other aspects, and (7) no evidence for effects of the unique culture or history of the places we studied. Moreover, (8) location in the former GDR still has a substantial impact, whereas (9) other place-specific conditions (deprivation, demographic decline, migration, rurality) that could be addressed by policy interventions have no or rather weak effects. We conclude that PRR sentiment in 'places that don't matter' results also, though by no means exclusively, from a lack of recognition.}, html = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/place-does-matter-for-populist-radical-right-sentiment-but-how-evidence-from-germany/7C639AAC5F6B1BC2F6324F7D57136827}, pdf = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/7C639AAC5F6B1BC2F6324F7D57136827/S1755773923000279a.pdf/place-does-matter-for-populist-radical-right-sentiment-but-how-evidence-from-germany.pdf}, doi = {10.1017/S1755773923000279} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “Identification with an anti-system party undermines diffuse political support: The case of Alternative for Germany and trust in the Federal Constitutional Court.” Party Politics 31.3 (2024): 397-409. doi:10.1177/13540688241237493
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]The rise of the far right is increasingly raising the question of whether partisanship can have negative consequences for democracy. While issues such as partisan bias and affective polarization have been extensively researched, little is known about the relationship between identification with anti-system parties and diffuse system support. I address this gap by introducing a novel indicator and utilising the GESIS panel dataset, which tracks the rise of a new party, “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) from 2013, when the party was founded, to 2017, when the AfD, now transformed into a right-wing populist and anti-system party, entered the federal parliament for the first time. Employing a panel fixed effects design, I demonstrate that identification with “Alternative for Germany” reduces trust in the Federal Constitutional Court by a considerable margin. These findings are robust across various alternative specifications, suggesting that the effects of anti-system party identification should not be dismissed.
@Article{arzheimer-2024, author = {Kai Arzheimer}, title = {Identification with an anti-system party undermines diffuse political support: The case of Alternative for Germany and trust in the Federal Constitutional Court}, journal = {Party Politics}, year = 2024, volume = 31, number = 3, pages = {397-409}, keywords = {EuroReX, AfD}, abstract = {The rise of the far right is increasingly raising the question of whether partisanship can have negative consequences for democracy. While issues such as partisan bias and affective polarization have been extensively researched, little is known about the relationship between identification with anti-system parties and diffuse system support. I address this gap by introducing a novel indicator and utilising the GESIS panel dataset, which tracks the rise of a new party, "Alternative for Germany" (AfD) from 2013, when the party was founded, to 2017, when the AfD, now transformed into a right-wing populist and anti-system party, entered the federal parliament for the first time. Employing a panel fixed effects design, I demonstrate that identification with "Alternative for Germany" reduces trust in the Federal Constitutional Court by a considerable margin. These findings are robust across various alternative specifications, suggesting that the effects of anti-system party identification should not be dismissed.}, doi = {10.1177/13540688241237493}, pdf = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/13540688241237493}, html = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688241237493} } - Arzheimer, Kai, Carl Berning, Sarah de Lange, Jerome Dutozia, Jocelyn Evans, Myles Gould, Eelco Harteveld, Nick Hood, Gilles Ivaldi, Paul Norman, Wouter van der Brug, and Tom van der Meer. “How Local Context Affects Populist Radical Right Support: A Cross-National Investigation Into Mediated and Moderated Relationships.” British Journal of Political Science online first (2024): 1-26. doi:10.1017/S0007123424000085
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]Populist radical right (PRR) parties are often more successful in some regions of their countries than in others. However, previous research shows that the relationship between context and PRR support is not straightforward. We develop and test an expanded framework linking local conditions to PRR support through two causal mechanisms. First, we argue economic and cultural contextual factors can influence citizens by fostering a sense of perceived local decline, which in turn predicts both populist and nativist attitudes and, hence, PRR support (mediation). Second, we expect that citizens with fewer resources and stronger local embeddedness are more strongly influenced by the context in which they live (moderation). Combining geocoded survey data with contextual data from four countries (DE, FR, GB and NL), we show that the link between local context and PRR support is indeed mediated and moderated, providing a better understanding of the spatial distribution behind recent PRR success.
@Article{arzheimer-et-al-2024, author = {Arzheimer, Kai and Berning, Carl and de Lange, Sarah and Dutozia, Jerome and Evans, Jocelyn and Gould, Myles and Harteveld, Eelco and Hood, Nick and Ivaldi, Gilles and Norman, Paul and van der Brug, Wouter and van der Meer, Tom}, title = {How Local Context Affects Populist Radical Right Support: A Cross-National Investigation Into Mediated and Moderated Relationships}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, year = 2024, pages = {1-26}, abstract = {Populist radical right (PRR) parties are often more successful in some regions of their countries than in others. However, previous research shows that the relationship between context and PRR support is not straightforward. We develop and test an expanded framework linking local conditions to PRR support through two causal mechanisms. First, we argue economic and cultural contextual factors can influence citizens by fostering a sense of perceived local decline, which in turn predicts both populist and nativist attitudes and, hence, PRR support (mediation). Second, we expect that citizens with fewer resources and stronger local embeddedness are more strongly influenced by the context in which they live (moderation). Combining geocoded survey data with contextual data from four countries (DE, FR, GB and NL), we show that the link between local context and PRR support is indeed mediated and moderated, providing a better understanding of the spatial distribution behind recent PRR success.}, volume = {online first}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123424000085}, html = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/how-local-context-affects-populist-radical-right-support-a-crossnational-investigation-into-mediated-and-moderated-relationships/E4FA77D349517867C8876A79EB80BC24} } - Arzheimer, Kai, Theresa Bernemann, and Timo Sprang. “Oppression of Catholics in Prussia Does Not Explain Spatial Differences in Support for the Radical Right in Germany. A Critique of Haffert (2022).” Electoral Studies 89 (2024): 102789. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102789
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]A growing literature links contemporary far-right mobilization to the “legacies” of events in the distant past, but often, the effects are small, and their estimates appear to rely on problematic assumptions. We re-analyse Haffert’s (2022) study, a key example of this strand of research. Haffert claims that historical political oppression of Catholics in Prussia moderates support for the radical right AfD party among Catholics in contemporary Germany. While the argument itself has intellectual merit, we identify some severe limitations in the empirical strategy. Retesting the study’s cross-level interaction hypothesis using more suitable multi-level data and a more appropriate statistical model, we find a modest overall difference in AfD support between formerly Prussian and non-Prussian territories. However, this difference is unrelated to individual Catholic religion or to the contextual presence of Catholics. This contradicts the oppression hypothesis. Our study thus provides another counterpoint to the claim that historical events have strong and long-lasting effects on contemporary support for the radical right. We conclude that simpler explanations for variations in radical right support should be exhausted before resorting to history.
@Article{arzheimer-bernemann-sprang-2024, author = {Arzheimer, Kai and Bernemann, Theresa and Sprang, Timo}, title = {Oppression of Catholics in Prussia Does Not Explain Spatial Differences in Support for the Radical Right in Germany. A Critique of Haffert (2022)}, journal = {Electoral Studies}, year = 2024, volume = 89, pages = 102789, abstract = {A growing literature links contemporary far-right mobilization to the "legacies" of events in the distant past, but often, the effects are small, and their estimates appear to rely on problematic assumptions. We re-analyse Haffert's (2022) study, a key example of this strand of research. Haffert claims that historical political oppression of Catholics in Prussia moderates support for the radical right AfD party among Catholics in contemporary Germany. While the argument itself has intellectual merit, we identify some severe limitations in the empirical strategy. Retesting the study's cross-level interaction hypothesis using more suitable multi-level data and a more appropriate statistical model, we find a modest overall difference in AfD support between formerly Prussian and non-Prussian territories. However, this difference is unrelated to individual Catholic religion or to the contextual presence of Catholics. This contradicts the oppression hypothesis. Our study thus provides another counterpoint to the claim that historical events have strong and long-lasting effects on contemporary support for the radical right. We conclude that simpler explanations for variations in radical right support should be exhausted before resorting to history.}, html = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424000477}, pdf = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424000477/pdfft?md5=8b0c75faf974eb845135c7c1e0f41c14&pid=1-s2.0-S0261379424000477-main.pdf}, doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102789} }
Click here for my full list of publications.
Consultancy
- Media: I regularly comment on German and European parties and their voters, and on political extremism.
- Research Methods: I have been teaching methods, statistics and software in academic settings since 1996 and offer consultancy and in-house seminars.
